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MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
service is made after the suit is brought, not only to avoid process, but
to frustrate any orders which may be issued, contempt will lie.26
In the instant case, the court reasoned that respondent's flight, and
the fact that his attorney had notified him of the court's proposed
future issuance of the order, together with the fact that contemner knew
that he was awaiting sentencing, justified the conclusion that he had
actual knowledge of the issuance of the order. Rather than relying upon
the inherent power of the court to punish for contempt, it cited respondent
for violating a particular order which the court had issued. In reality the
court has established a new interpretation of constructive contempt by
holding that one may be guilty of contempt for violating a court order
before the order has been issued. The holding presents a unique27 con-
ception of when contempt will lie under the statutory provision.28 The
court seems to be taking a strong backward step from the trend of expand-
ing the rights of a contemner as expressed in recent statutes and court
decisions.
COURTS-STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION-EXTRINSIC AIDS
.Defendant failed to pay an income tax on money he had eitorted.
Held, by construction of § 22(a) of the Internal Revenue Code, money
obtained by extortion is taxable income. Rutkin v. United States, 343 U.S.
130 (1952).
Statutes must be frequently applied to situations not contemplated
at the time of their enactment. Any interpretation by the Supreme Court
becomes an integral part of the satute and is positive law.t Because the
separation of powers doctrine demands that the legislature make all major
policy legislation,2 the Court's duty is merely to determine probable legis-
lative intent.3  To prevent unnecessary judicial "legislation," especially
when construing legislation involving either federal or state supremacy or
a question of balance of powers within the government itself,4 the Court,
in its first construction of a statute, employs extrinsic aids such as previous
legislative history,5 standing committee reports,6 sponsor's explanations 7
26. In re Rice, 181 Fed. 217 (M.D. Ala. 1910). Cf. Aarons v. State, 105 Miss. 402,
62 So. 419 (1913).
27. See United States v. Hall, 198 F.2d 726, 729 (2nd Cir. 1952), Clark, J., dis-
scnting: ' . . exhaustive independent research has disclosed no similar case. It is
probably the first time that a proceeding like this has been before the courts."
28. See note 1 supra.
1. Guaranty Trust Co. v. Blodgett, 287 U.S. 509 (1933); White County v. Gwin,
136 Ind. 562, 36 N.E. 237 (1894).
2. FTC v. Bunte Bros., 312 U.S. 349 (1940).
3. Bardes v. Ilawarden Bank, 178 U.S. 524 (1900).
4. Palmer v. Massachusetts, 308 U.S. 79 (1939).
5. Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Lenroot, 323 U.S. 490 (1945); Boone v. Light.
ncr, 319 U.S. 561 (1943); Federal Communications v. Columbia Broadcasting System,
311 U.S. 132 (1940).
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and special committee reports.8 If, in an atmosphere of public debate,9
Congress does not act this initial interpretation is considered to have estab-
lished the legislative intent.' 0 Until recently, the Court in re-examining
the construction employed congressional silence as an extrinsic aid."
With the exception of those questions involving constitutional prob-
Iems, 12 failure of the legislature to act affirmatively over several sessions
since a judicial construction of its enactments indicates legislative accept-
ance of the Court's original construction.' 3  Congressional silence, while
closely associated with stare decisis," was employed so that Congress would
not be forced to enact constant declaratory legislation.' 5 However, since
1940,16 the Court without apparent reason has intermittently failed to
recognize 1 the use of congressional silence as an extrinsic aid in determin-
ing legislative intent.
The first judicial construction of the word "gain""' in Section 22(a)
of the Internal Revenue Code' held that embezzled money (and intimated
monies derived from other related crimes20 ) was not taxable as a gain be-
cause a duty to return such money existed. Although Congress did not
act affirmatively to change this construction, the majority of the Court
in the instant case, distinguishing on the facts, 2' in effect reversed the pre-
vious construction by holding that the extorter must pay in income tax.22
Employing extrinsic aids similar to those used in the first construction,?
6. Chamberlain, The Courts and Committee Reports, 1 U. OF C11. L. Riv. 81
(1934).
7. Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Products, 322 U.S. 607 (1944).
8. United States v. Pfitsch, 256 U.S. 547 (1921).
9. Missouri v. Ross, 299 U.S. 72 (1936).
10. United States v. Elgin J. and L. Rv., 298 U.S. 492 (1936). See dissent of
Frankfurter, I., in Comm r of Internal Revenue v. Church, 335 U.S. 632, 687, 688 (1949).
11. Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940).
12. Neither stare decisis nor congressional silence over many years will prevent over-
ruling long standing interpretation if the court considers the interpretation unconstitutional.
See Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 830 (1946); Erie v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 6-1
(1938), overruling Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842); Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Baugh.
149 U.S. 368 (1893).
13. United States v. N. H. Pulaski Co, 243 U.S. 97 (1917).
14. Hunter v. State, 85 Fla. 91, 95 So. 115 (1923).
15. Note, 49 1IARv. L. REv. 137 (1935).
16. Helverging v. Hollock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940). "Silence and inaction by Con-
gress are insufficient alone to debar the court from re-examining its own doctrines."
17. Bruce's Juices v. American Can Co., 330 U.S. 743, 750 (1947); Screws v. United
States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945); Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940) (applied).
Rutkin v. United States, 343 U.S. 130 (1952); Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61
(1946); Helvering v. Griffiths, 318 U.S. 371 (1943) (not applied).
18. Commissioners of Internal Revenue v. Wilcox, 327 U.S. 404 (1946).
19. 52 STAT. 457 (1938), 26 U.S.C. § 22(a) (1946).
20. Commissioners of Internal Revenue v. Wilcox, 327 U.S. 404, 408 (1946).
21. Stevenson-Chislett, Inc. v. United States, 98 F. Supp. 252 (W.D. Pa. 1951).
22. Query: Does not the extorter owe a duty to return the extorted money to the
victim? See dissent by Black, J. in Rutkin v. United States, 343 U.S. 130, 136 (1952).
And see Corbett, Taxation, Embezzled Funds, 26 B.U.L. REv. 404 (1946).
23. Rutkin v. United States, 343 U.S 130, 136 (1952).
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the Court reasoned that the legislature had intended this crime to be
included as an unlawful gain. 4
The exercise of certain legislative functions by the court is an inescapa.
ble product of the judicial process of determining congressional intent,
But this must be clearly distinguished from the instances where the court
changes its previous interpretation. There, the result is not merely a
necessary consequence of the judicial process, but if proper weight is not
given to congressional silence, becomes judicial legislation." Because
the court's original construction of this section of the Internal Revenue
Code allowed the embezzler in some instances to set up his crime to defeat
the tax,20 national debate following27 the decision stimulated discussion of
the possibility of law enforcement through the tax power.28  But in the six
year period following this decision Congress did not act to establish
such a policy.
29
It is submitted that the construction in the instant case is judicial
legislation and has the effect of placing the federal government, through
the use of the tax power, on the state level of criminal law enforcement.
30
Whether federal law enforcement through the use of the tax power would
be a benefit to the federal system would be a policy decision of such major
importance that it clearly rests with Congress.3' The present Court,3 2 by
exercising a legislative function, continues to place upon Congress the
affirmative duty to act explicitly on every judicial construction of its
statutes.
INFANTS - AGE DETERMINING JURISDICTION OVER ACTS
OF JUVENILE OFFENDERS - FEDERAL JUVENILE
DELINQUENCY ACT
Defendant was charged with the unlawful possession of counterfeit
currency.' He moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that the court
24. Note that neither the Wilcox nor the Rutkin Case affect the taxation of funds
from illegal ventures because in most states, the other party, being in pari delicto, has no
legal right to recover the money. fohnson v. United States, 318 U.S. 189 (1943) (num-
be- syndicate); United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259 (1927) (illegal liquor traffic).
IC Anderson v. Wilson, 289 U.S. 20 (1933).
26. McCue v. Comm'r, March 4, 1946 Memo. Op., Dkts. 233, 315, 464, CCH Fed.
Tar Rep. 7343 (in).
" See Note, 25 TEx. L. REv. 693 (1947); Note, 46 CoL. L. Rav. 677 (1946).
28. Note, 48 COL. L. REv. 100 (1948).
29. Stevenson-Chislett, Inc. v. United States, 98 F. Supp. 252 (W.D. Pa. 1951)
(Crrgress allowed deduction of loss by victim).
30. McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27 (1903).
31. See dissent of Stone, C. f. in Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 70 (1946).
32. See Palmer, Dissents and Overulings, 34 A.B.A.J. 554 (1948) (failure of con-
sistent application of the extrinsic aid of congressional silence is one of the major factors
splitting our presently divided court).
1. 62 STAT. 705 (1948), 18 U.S.C. § 472 (1951) (uttering counterfeit obligations oi
securities); 62 STAT. 701 (1948), 18 U.S.C. § 371 1951) (conspiracy to commit offense
